Indiana Law Journal
Volume 60

Issue 3

Article 5

Summer 1985

Access, Efficiency, and Fairness in Dirks v. SEC
Malcolm A. Tripp
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tripp, Malcolm A. (1985) "Access, Efficiency, and Fairness in Dirks v. SEC," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 60 :
Iss. 3 , Article 5.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol60/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Access, Efficiency, and Fairness
in Dirks v. SEC
INTRODUCTION

Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act prohibits insiders
from unfairly taking advantage of material, nonpublic information concerning a corporation. In Dirks v. SEC, I Dirks was a securities analyst who
had been tipped by an insider of Equity Funding Corporation of America
that the success of the company was due in part to fraud. 2 Dirks corroborated
sources of the information he received by further investigations and disseminated the information to his clients.3 The Supreme Court, reversing the
court of appeals, held that "the tippee's duty to abstain or disclose is
derivative from that of the insider's duty." '4 The Court further held that the
insider Secrist did not breach his fiduciary duty to the shareholders of Equity
Funding because he did not intend to gain personally from the release of
the information to Dirks.5 Dirks, therefore, was said not to have breached
6
any duty by disclosing the information to his clients.
The Dirks decision is the first in which the Court has ruled that a motive
of personal gain is necessary to invoke liability under section 10(b) of the
7
1934 Securities and Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereafter.

1. Dirks
2. Id. at
3. Id.
4. Id. at
5. Id. at
6. Id. at

v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
3258.
3262.
3265.
3266.

7. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for any person ...(b) to use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security ...any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."
SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), promulgated pursuant to the SEC's rule-making
authority in 1942, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material part or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
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The improper purpose requirement, however, is not the only novel concept
articulated in the Dirks opinion.' In a footnote destined to have significant
impact on later actions, 9 the majority opinion stated: "Under certain circumstances, such as when corporate information is revealed legitimately to
an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant, working for the corporation, these outsiders may become a fiduciary of the shareholders."' 0 This
dictum from Dirks has been used in another case to change the status of a
trader from an outsider to a "temporary insider.""
The Supreme Court in addition to the "improper purpose" requirement
and the "temporary insider" concept, acknowledged and perhaps implicitly
confirmed the viability of the misappropriation theory by stating "nor did
Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain information about Equity Funding.' 2 Though the misappropriation theory had-been used successfully in
lower court cases before Dirks, ,3 the acknowledgement of the theory by the
Supreme Court might imply that a majority of the Court could acquiesce
to Chief Justice Burger's misappropriation theory and hence give it suste4
nance in subsequent actions.
While the "temporary insider" concept and misappropriation theory should
be a boon to SEC enforcement efforts, the "improper purpose" requirement
will create a heavier evidentiary burden in any action against a tipper under
10(b) and lob-5.' 5 Combined, these concepts of lOb-5 liability should have
an interesting, perhaps offsetting, effect on the number and success of SEC
enforcement actions.' 6 Because these theories are mentioned in a case that
is so different in its facts from earlier cases, 7 they also provide an opportunity
to reconcile the results of earlier cases and to evaluate the consistency of
different legal and economic theories that have been espoused in the context
of securities fraud. This Note focuses on selected legal and economic ar-

8. The majority might not want to consider the improper purpose requirement or the
temporary insider theory as novel. However, it did not occur to defendants or plaintiffs,
respectively, to argue these theories until after Dirks.
9. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14. A spokesman for the SEC stated that the SEC believed
that the Dirks opinion would encourage, not inhibit, further SEC actions because of the concept
the Court articulated in the footnote. N.Y.L.J., Aug. 18, 1983, at 1 col. 1.
10. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
11. SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
12. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3267.
13. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
14. Justices Burger and Brennan espoused the misappropriation (theory?) first in Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Concededly, the Court may have mentioned the misappropriation theory in Dirks to persuade Chief Justice Burger to sign the majority opinion. However,
it is also probable that Justices Blackmun and Marshall would affirm the misappropriation theory.
See 445 U.S. at 232 (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
15. The SEC argued that a tippee inherited the insider's disclose or refrain duty whenever
he knowingly received material non-public information. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261-62. The
improper purpose requirement, however, mandates that the tippee must also know that the tip
was made improperly.
16. See N.Y.L.J., supra note 9.
17. The Supreme Court refers to the facts of Dirks as extraordinary. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at
3263, 3268.
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guments in an effort to harmonize the results of earlier rulings and help

give substance to the nebulous concept of a fiduciary in criminal actions
under 1Ob-5. Section I provides a brief background and prelude to the Dirks

case, then section II discusses the misappropriation and temporary insider
theories, and the personal gain requirement. Section III considers different
policy arguments in an effort to give substance to the fiduciary concept and
the vaguely defined policies of fairness and market efficiency. In section IV
the arguments of selected Justices are discussed in the context of a balancing
test that uses the policy arguments from section III. Section V concludes
with a brief discussion of the applicability of a balancing test due to competing policy interests.

I. BACKGROUND
A.

Common Law

Before the Securities Acts, the plaintiff normally tried to extend the
common law tort of misrepresentation to reach nondisclosures of corporate
information in transactions involving a corporate official of the issuer.' 8 In
recognition of the fiduciary relationship existing between shareholders and
corporate officers and directors, this rule was expanded in some cases to
include a general duty of disclosure on the part of the corporate director
or officer when transacting with the shareholders.' 9
The fiduciary principle arose from two different but related concepts.
First, an actual expectation of fair dealing arising from a relationship of
trust and confidence requires the corporate officer to act according to the
shareholder's reliance.20 Second, and on a broader basis, a person holding
the property or welfare in trust for a beneficiary should exhibit loyalty by
acting in the best interest of the beneficiary.2 ' The rationale was offered in

18. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), is the seminal case of enforcing the common
law tort of misrepresentation in cases of silence between a corporate director and a shareholder.
Normally, an affirmative misrepresentation was required, but the Court referred to the civil
code's definition of deceit: "When by use of 'words or insidious machinations' one induces
another to execute a contract without which he would not have made." The Court's rationale
became known as the "special facts" doctrine of imposing a duty of disclosure upon a corporate
director. See also, Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); W. CARY & M. EISENBERO,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 714-17 (5th ed. 1980); Hill, The Sale of Controlling
Shares, 70 HARv. L. REV. 986, 1014-18 (1957); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 725, 740.46 (1956).
19. E.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530,
16 P.2d 531 (1933). Both of these cases relied on the general rule that affirmative disclosure
is required when the parties stand in a fiduciary relationship. See W. PROSSER, TiE LAW OF
TORTS § 106 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977).
20. E.g., Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1933). See also Langevoort,
Insider Trading and the FiduciaryPrinciple:A Post-ChiarellaRestatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
1 (1982).
21. See generally Scott, The FiduciaryPrinciple, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539 (1949). Even when
the parties do not trust each other there can still be a fiduciary relationship. See D. DOBBS,
REMEDIES 681 (1973). The shareholders have little to say in the selection of the fiduciary but
are still entitled to the performance of the duties whether they trust the fiduciary or not.
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some cases that even when there is no communication between the two
parties and the corporate official does not solicit a price offering, the concept
of loyalty requires the corporate officer to share his information so as not
2
to gain at the expense of the beneficiary.
This fiduciary principle, which was derived from common law trust and
misrepresentation concepts, 2a was awkwardly applied to the relationship between the corporate official and the shareholder. 24 The concepts of trust and
misrepresentation did not identify whether the corporate official owed a duty
to the corporation, to the shareholder, or to both. 21 Moreover, while the
fiduciary principle was tailored for face to face transactions between insiders
and shareholders, it was difficult to apply in an institutional, anonymous
marketplace like the New York Stock Exchange. 26 On the exchange, persons
do not know who their buyers are, and because of the independence of27
buyer and seller decisions, causation and injury are difficult to trace.
Consequently, the first state court to consider this question rejected the
obligation of affirmative disclosure for an insider in a stock exchange transaction.28

B. Expansion Under 10(b) and 10b-5
Early cases under 10(b) and lOb-5 imposed the common law fiduciary
duty of disclosure on corporate insiders in face-to-face transactions, 29 but

22. See List v. Fashion Park, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1968); Bruce v. Rosenberg, 463 F.

Supp. 673 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
23. See generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1430 (1961).
24. The hornbook elements of deceit are: There must be (1) a false representation of (2) a
material (3) fact; (4) the defendant must know of the falsity (scienter) but make the statement
nevertheless for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it; and (5) the plaintiff must
justifiably rely on it and (6) suffer damages as a consequence. Id. at 1431.
25. See generally Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securites Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).

26. In a face-to-face transaction the element of inducement is more obvious than on a
market exchange.
27. See generally Shulman, supra note 25.

28. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). See generally Comment, The
Prospectsfor Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120
(1950).

29. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). In Kardon both defendants and plaintiffs were
directors. Defendants had negotiated a sale of the corporation's assets to outsiders without
telling the plaintiffs. The court in deciding upon the applicability of Rule lOb-5 stated that
"the broad terms of the Act are to be made effective in a case like the present one through
the application of well known and well established equitable principles governing fiduciary
relationships." 73 F. Supp. at 803. Furthermore the defendants breached this duty when they
"disposed of the bulk of the corporate assets to an outsider, for their own benefit, without
disclosing the transaction to the plaintiffs or giving them an opportunity to participate in it."
Id. at 802. In Speed, the plaintiffs claimed that Transamerica, the majority shareholder of

Axton-Fisher Tobacco Company, had purchased Axton-Fisher stock from the plaintiffs without
disclosing that the value of Axton-Fisher's inventory was far in excess of the amount indicated
in its annual report and that Transamerica intended to capture such inventory by merger with,
or dissolution of Axton-Fisher. The court held that the defendants violated lOb-5 because they
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not until the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co. did the shift of
the insider trading doctrine begin. 30 In Cady, Roberts, a director of CurtissWright Corp. who was also the representative of a broker-dealer informed
Gintel, another representative of the same broker-dealer, that Curtiss-Wright
Corp. would be cutting its regular dividend. Gintel immediately entered sell
orders for his wife's and his customers' Curtiss-Wright stock. Shortly thereafter, the information was released publicly and the price dropped quickly
and substantially.
The Commission began its analysis by noting of the affirmative duty of
disclosure that this "special obligation has been traditionally required of...
officers, directors, and controlling stockholders.' '3 Furthermore this special

obligation rested on two principal elements:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.3"

Under this test the Commission found that Gintel had breached this special
obligation,33 and the Commission introduced three concepts that would permeate later lOb-5 actions. First, the Commission significantly expanded rule
lob-5 by announcing that the duty is not confined to classic insiders; 34 rather,
the duty is imposed on any person who has a "relationship" through which
he acquires information regarding a corporation's internal affairs.3 5 Second,
the duty is owed to existing and future stockholders. 6 Third, the Commission's reliance on the inherent unfairness of trading on the basis of nonpublic information added a novel and surprisingly subjective approach for
37
assigning liability.
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the court embraced the SEC's inherent
unfairness approach and went one step further by advocating that "all
were majority stockholders and thus acquired a duty to disclose material facts affecting the
value of the stock known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside position but not
known to the selling minority stockholders. 99 F. Supp. at 828-29. The court noted that the
duty of disclosure arises from the "necessity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing
his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders .... Some courts
have called this a fiduciary duty while others state it is a duty imposed by 'special circumstances.' " Id. at 829.
30. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
31. Id. at 912.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. A "classic" insider is an officer or director of the corporation.
35. 40 S.E.C. at 912.
36. Id. at 913-14. This duty had a basis in common law, not just under lOb-5. Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
37. The court could have extended the common law doctrine to impose the disclosure duty
on a person who receives information from a classic insider without introducing the relative
fairness of trading on the basis of unshared or unequal information, by linking the duty back
to the insider.
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investors on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material

information. ' 38 The court shifted the focus of the disclose or refrain duty
from a fiduciary relationship to possession of information by declaring that

"anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to
protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain

from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside
information remains undisclosed." 3 9 In In re Investors Management Co.,

the Commission also accepted the equal access theory. 40 In Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., the court pushed the equal access
theory to its logical extreme by imposing upon the insiders a duty to the
marketplace rather than solely to those who purchased stock from them. 4'

38. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Texas Gulf Corp. discovered substantial mineral
deposits in eastern Canada and sought to keep the information confidential in order to allow
the company to acquire mineral rights for the adjoining areas. When rumors began to circulate,
Texas Gulf issued a press release indicating that reports of the find were greatly exaggerated.
From the period of the original drilling until the second press release, which announced a great
strike, insiders and their tippees purchased Texas Gulf stock and calls without disclosing
information regarding the find. In holding that the corporation's various insiders and tippees
had violated Rule 1Ob-5, the Second Circuit expanded the parameters of the insider trading
doctrine far beyond earlier court decisions and in some respects beyond Cady, Roberts.
39. 401 F.2d at 848.
40. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). Employees of Merrill Lynch, a prospective underwriter for Douglas
Aircraft, tipped clients of Douglas Aircraft that a forthcoming quarterly report would show
substantially reduced earnings and earning estimates. The commission held that "one who
obtains possession of material, non-public corporation information, which he has reason to
know emanates from a corporate source and which by itself places him in a position superior
to other investors, thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that information within the
purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions." Id. at 644.
41. 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1974). Shapiro was an investor who bought shares of
Douglas stock between the discovery of minerals and the second press release announcing the
strike. The court wrote: "We hold that defendants owed a duty-for the breach of which they
may be held liable in this private action for damages-not only to the purchasers of the actual
shares sold by defendants (in the likely event they can be identified) but to all persons who
during the same period purchased Douglas stock in the open market without knowledge of the
material inside information which was in possession of defendants." Id. at 237.
Shapiro was important in several other respects. First, the court held that lOb-5 was applicable
in a private damage action, not just an injunction action as in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Second,
it held that tippees could incur liability even though they did not trade themselves. Finally, the
court held that neither reliance nor privity was a requisite to lob-5 liability. Instead, the
plaintiffs must only prove that the information was material and withheld by the defendants.
Several other courts have disagreed with the harsh result of Shapiro that allows damages to
all purchasers of stock during the period between defendants' transactions and the public
disclosure of the information; these damages could easily and substantially exceed the losses
avoided or gains acquired through the use of insider information. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542
F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); see Imperial Supply Co. v.
Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339, 354-55 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
Even the Second Circuit has evinced an intent to limit the potential scope of Shapiro by
emphasizing that only plaintiffs who trade contemporaneously with the insider or tippee may
prove causation in fact and thus recover damages. Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications
Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1981); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 17273 (2d Cir. 1980).
Other courts have confirmed the Shapiro analysis that proof of relationship to the source was
not necessary. See, e.g., SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v.
Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).
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Though Shapiro is a private action as opposed to a criminal action, it
represents the 2decaying of the fiduciary duty concept before Chiarella v.
4

United States.

C.

Chiarella: Revival of the Fiduciary
Relationship Requirement

The expansion of insider trading liability based on equal access to information was ostensibly extinguished by the Supreme Court in Chiarella v.
United States."3 Vincent Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer, identified takeover targets from the documents being printed and used this
information to trade in the securities of the targets. 4
In a complicated decision, the Court began with an analysis of the common
law and stated that "the duty to disclose arises when one party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or
other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.' -45 The Court
concluded that Chiarella owed no duty to the sellers of the target company's
stock because he "had no prior dealings with them. He was not a fiduciary,
he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence.
He was rather, a complete stranger .... "46 Thus in both result and language
the Court apparently brought an abrupt end to the "equal access" doctrine
and revived the fiduciary concept.
II.

DIRKS AND THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY, TEMPORARY
INSIDER THEORY, AND PERSONAL GAIN REQUIREMENT

In basing the duty to disclose or abstain on a fiduciary relationship, the
Court in Chiarella v. United States47 relied on common law principles and

42. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
43. Id.
44. Chiarella did not simply read the names from the documents. The documents were
anonymous in an effort to keep the identity of the firms secret. Id. at 245.
45. Id. at 229 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). Powell delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Stevens
filed a concurring opinion. Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Burger filed
a dissenting opinion. Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Marshall joined.
Justices Brennan and Burger both argued that Chiarella's conviction should be affirmed because
he breached a fiduciary duty by misappropriating confidential information from his employer.
Burger stated that he read § 10(b) and rule lob-5 "to mean that a person who has misappropriated non-public information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain
from trading." Id. at 241.
The majority did not decide whether the misappropriate theory was valid because it was not
submitted to the jury. The Court specifically noted that the jury instructions were deficient
because they contained no "elements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone other than the
sellers." Id. at 237. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment and disagreed with Justice
Burger because he felt that a fiduciary relationship was never identified and submitted to the
jury.
46. Id. at 233-34.
47. 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980).
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the two elements articulated in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 48 The common
law notion of fiduciary duties as they applied to corporations and the
securities markets, however, was not uniform49 and the rationale in Cady,
Roberts places very little significance on duties." Consequently, the Court
did not delineate precisely what, duties and relationships were within the
51
parameters of the fiduciary concept.
In Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court emphatically affirmed the analysis
in Chiarella:a duty arises only from a fiduciary relationship, not from mere
possession of information.52 The "temporary insider" concept, "improper
purpose" requirement and misappropriation theory, however, add another
dimension to the Court's analysis. Although the rationale from SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,13 In re Investors Management Co.,5" and Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 55 is supposedly rejected, the results are
not. In Texas Gulf, the tippers could be liable because they received information for an improper purpose;5 6 and in Investors Management and Shapiro
the underwriters could be classified as "temporary insiders," thereby violating
their duty by releasing information.57 In each instance, the insiders who
divulged the information, whether they were temporary or regular, received
a personal gain from the release of the information according to the guidelines
established by Dirks. 8
A.

The Expansiveness of the Misappropriationand
Temporary Insider Concepts

The potential expansiveness of the fiduciary principle in the context of
Dirks is vivid when applied to a situation such as in Chiarella. First, Chiarella
could be considered a temporary insider of the acquiring corporation. Certainly, Chiarella entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprises and was given access to information
for corporate purposes by virtue of his employment with the printing firm. 9 It
is equally obvious that the corporation expected to keep the information

48. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
49. See supra notes 18-29.

50. The elements of the Cady, Roberts rationale are cast in terms of "access" and "fairness." Thus the duty there depends on "access" and "fairness," as opposed to a fiduciary
relationship that is articulated in Chiarella.
51. The holding in Chiarellais narrow: the possession of information does not give rise to
a duty to disclose or abstain. 445 U.S. at 235.
52. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983).
53. 401 F.2d 833 (1st Cir. 1968).
54. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
55. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
56. See supra note 38.
57. See supra notes 40 & 41.

58. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265. See also infra notes 80 & 81 and accompanying text for a
discussion of what could be deemed improper.
59. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
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confidential, and that the relationship implied such a duty because the names
of the firms were meant to be kept secret.60 The main roadblock to a theory
is that the Supreme Court made reference only to situations in which the
information was acquired legitimately, as in the case of an underwriter,
hand, stole inaccountant, lawyer or consultant. 6' Chiarella, on the other
62
formation that was never intended to be given to him.
Also, as Chief Justice Burger indicated in his dissent, Chiarella could be
liable for "misappropriating" the information. 63 Indeed, the misappropriation theory has been used successfully in at least two lower court cases since
Chiarella. In United States v. Newman, 64 employees of an investment banker
told others of impending acquisitions or tender offers. These "tippers" then
purchased securities of the target companies based on their possession of
insider information. 65 The court of appeals held that the employees, by
divulging the information, could have breached a duty of silence owed to
their employers, "sullying the reputations of [the employers] as safe repositories of client confidences," which acted as a fraud upon them. 66 The
misappropriation theory was also used successfully in SEC v. Materia67-a
case with facts nearly identical to Chiarella.Materia worked for a financial
printer and purchased securities of five corporations based on material nonpublic information he received via his employment. 68 The district court relied
on and upheld the Newman decision, ruling that the use of the information
by the printer's employee operated as fraud on the bidders in the tender offer
and did not require a pre-existing duty or other link between the defendant
purchaser and shareholder of the target company. 9 In Newman and Materia,
both tender offer cases and criminal actions, the courts held that the fraud
had been committed upon the acquiring companies, and that the purchase
of securities from the issuer, furthermore, satisfied the "in connection with" 7
clause, thus invoking liability under lob-5.

60. Id.
61. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
62. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
63. See id. at 242 (citing In re Blythe & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037, 1040 (1969)).
64. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 17.
67. [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,526 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
68. Id.
69. The court held that neither Dirks nor Moss v. Morgan Stanley, see infra text accompanying notes 71-75, undermined Newman. It argued that the court in Moss simply denied
recovery of damages by a seller of the target company's securities on the ground that there
was no duty to the seller, but didn't purport to overrule Newman. The court further felt it
necessary to distinguish Dirks on the ground that disclosure in that case involved exposure of
a crime.
The fact that the court distinguished Dirks reveals that it was a bit uncomfortable with the
relationship it developed between Materia and the acquiring firm. It also suggests the possibility
of lower courts construing Dirks very narrowly, thus limiting its rationale to cases that involve
the exposure of fraud.
70. Normally, fraud under lOb-5 is based on the relationship between purchaser and seller.
Under the misappropriation theory as used in Newman and Materia, there was no relationship
between the purchaser and seller. See note 7 for the context of "in connection with."
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One case that could inhibit the use of the "temporary insider" and
misappropriation theory is Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., a private damage
action that dealt with a proposed tender offer.' Courtois, an employee of
the mergers and acquisitions department of Morgan Stanley, told two others
about a proposed tender offer. The three subsequently bought 11,200 shares
of the target company's stock on Nov. 30, 1976. On the same day, the
appellant Moss sold 5000 shares of the company's stock. Moss subsequently
commenced a class action on behalf of the investors who sold the target
stock on Nov. 30, 1976, alleging violations of lOb-5. 2 The court in Moss
held that the defendants were not traditional insiders and therefore did not
fall within the class of temporary insiders described in Dirks. The court stated,
however, that the complaint was "patently deficient" because it described
a fiduciary relationship only between the acquirer and Morgan Stanley and
was "barren of any factual allegations" that might create a duty between
the issuer and Morgan Stanley." Thus, if Moss could have described a fiduciary
relationship between the issuer and Morgan Stanley, one in which the investment banking firm was expected to keep any information concerning the tender
offer confidential, liability would have been plausible.
The court also rejected the misappropriation theory of Moss by saying:
"[n]othing in our opinion in Newman suggests that an employee's duty to
'abstain or disclose' with respect to his employer should be stretched to encompass an employee's 'duty of disclosure' to the general public."I" The court
is concerned with the same issue as in Chiarella: whether the abstain or
disclose duty depends on the relationship between parties or the mere possession of information. 75 Moss tried to establish a fiduciary duty in a conclusory
way: the defendants received nonpublic information and hence acquired a
fiduciary duty.76 But this concept of duty is precisely what Chiarellaand Dirks
emphatically rejected. Therefore, Moss' failure was not a failure of the misappropriation theory but a failure of Moss to establish a fiduciary duty based
on a relationship between the issuing corporation and Morgan Stanley. 7 The
court in Moss left open the possibility of finding a relationship between the
issuer and the defendant, thus preserving some of the vitality of the misappropriation theory in private damage actions factually similar to Moss. 8

71. [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.

REP.

(CCH)

99,478 (2d Cir. 1983).

72. Id. at 96,751.
73. Id. at 96,756.
74. Id. at 96,755.

75. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
76. This argument is perfectly tautological: one must disclose or abstain from trading on
material information when he has a duty to do so. He assumes that duty when he receives
material nonpublic information.
77. Moss at 96,758.
78. See id. at 96,756.
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The viability of the temporary insider and misappropriation theories is
supported by their successful employment in Newman and Materia."9 Hence,
while the Court has abolished the equal access to information doctrine and
made it more difficult to find outsiders guilty as tippees through the imposition of an improper purpose requirement, it has expanded the fiduciary
principle to allow some outsiders to be treated as insiders and thus ease the
evidentiary burden for the SEC. The ultimate unambiguous impact from the
combination of these theories is difficult to measure, however, because the
Court has explained each theory in vague and flexible terms.
B.

The Flexibility of Each Theory

The latitude the Supreme Court has awarded to the lower courts is particularly evident in the improper purpose requirement. The Court gave little
substance to what an improper purpose was or on which purpose to focus.
Secrist, the tipper in Dirks, conceivably had three purposes. One was to
expose a massive fraud; this is laudable. Another could have been to vindicate
himself for his earlier firing from Equity Funding."0 Finally, the means Secrist
chose to effectuate the other two purposes can be considered a purpose in
itself; Secrist intended Dirks to corroborate and spread his allegations causing
the stock price of Equity Funding to fall so drastically that trading would
have to be halted and an investigation commanded. While one of the purposes
is good, two of them could be considered bad and certainly the Court does
not mean that an insider must only entertain one proper motive. The Court,
furthermore, did not address why the good feeling of exposing fraud is not
personal gain in the context of a proper motive requirement while the good
feeling of giving information as a gift to a friend is personal gain.81
The temporary insider and misappropriation theories embody an equal
amount of vagueness and flexibility. Although the courts have given some
guidelines and examples, 2 it is not obvious what "certain circumstances"
and "special confidential relationships" give rise to fiduciary duty. In Moss,
for example, it is plausible that the plaintiff, Moss, could have established
a duty between the defendant and the issuing corporation. 3 And in SEC v.

79. For a case in which the temporary insider theory has been used successfully, see infra
note 84.
80. Secrist was employed by Bankers National Life Insurance Co., an Equity Funding
subsidiary. He told Dirks that he left it in protest over the way it was operated, but subsequently
it was revealed that he was fired. See the opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
21 SEC Docket 1401, 1402 n.5, 1402-1406 (1981).
81. Justice Blackmun is concerned with the means Secrist took to expose the fraud and the
elusiveness of what is proper or improper. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3273 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See also Wang, Recent Developments in the Federal Law Regulating Stock Market Insider
Trading, 6 CoRp. L. REv. 291, 328 (1983).
82. For guidelines and examples of a "temporary insider," see supra notes 71-79 and
accompanying text.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
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Lund, the district court found that a close friend of an insider who discussed

and entertained the possibility of a joint venture was a "temporary insider"
for purposes of the information he received during those discussions."'
It is possible that the Court has avoided a precise statement of the theories
of liability and instead based them on something as broad as fiduciary duties
in order to enhance the remedial purposes of rule 10b-5. 85 Justice Blackmun
obviously felt the Court's motives were more clandestine when he wrote that
the improper purpose requirement was simply based on a cost-benefit analysis

of Secrist's and Dirks' actions. In other words, the benefits of their action
outweighed the costs in this particular instance.8 6 Justice Blackmun apparently feels that the same ends could have been attained with less costly
means. 87 The Court's focus, however, was not the societal gain that resulted

84. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The Lund court held that a friend and business
associate of an insider who traded on the basis of material, nonpublic information disclosed
to him by the insider, was a "temporary insider" and therefore subject to a fiduciary duty
not to trade on the basis of the information.
The court pointed out that the defendant was told by an insider about negotiations with a
publicly-held company for a joint venture involving a Las Vegas gambling casino in order to
determine whether a company, of which he was chief executive officer, would make a capital
investment in the venture. The defendant did not have his company join in the venture, but
instead traded for his personal account.
The SEC on appeal abandoned its prior argument that Lund should be held liable on a theory
of tippee liability, but argued that the concept of an "insider" for purposes of rule lob-5 was
flexible and included not only officers and directors and controlling shareholders, but all those
who had a "special relationship affording access to inside information." The court accepted
this argument and held that "the test to determine insider status is whether the person has
access to confidential information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone." Id. at 1402 (quoting Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc.,
679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982)). Such persons,
although not traditional "insiders," nevertheless become fiduciaries of the corporation and the shareholders [as] "temporary insiders." They assume the duties
of an insider temporarily, by virtue of a special relationship with the corporation.
A temporary insider is subject to liability under § #10(b) for trading on the basis
of nonpublic material information received in the context of the special relationship.
Id. at 1403 (citations omitted).
85. See L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1436 (quoting from State v. Whitaker, 118 Or. 656,
661, 247 P. 1077, 1079 (1926)):
Were any hard and fast rule to be laid down as to what constitutes fraud ...
"a certain class of gentleman of the 'J. Rufus Wallingford' type-'they toil not
neither do they spin'-would lie awake nights endeavoring to conceive some
devious and shadowy way of evading the law. It is more advisable to deal with
each case as it arises."
86. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3272-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
The Court justifies Secrist's and Dirks' action because the general benefit derived
from the violation of Secrist's duty to shareholders ... in other words, because
the end justified the means. Under this view, the benefit conferred on society by
Secrist's and Dirks' activities may be paid for with the losses caused to shareholders
trading with Dirks' clients.
87. See id. at 3273. Justice Blackmun concedes himself, however, that sometimes it is
difficult to disclose information: "[tihe Commission tells persons with inside information that
they cannot trade on that information unless they disclose; it refuses, however, to tell them
how to disclose." Id.
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from Dirks' actions, but rather the future actions of individuals in situations
similar to the one that confronted Dirks. This is evident by its emphasis on
the nature of the market analyst's job and the importance of not deterring
their search for information. Had the Court merely been concerned with a
static cost-benefit analysis, it could hqve disposed of the issue with the same
result by ruling that the information Dirks disseminated had no legitimate
8
corporate purpose and hence was not inside information. " The Court simthan with
Chiarella
rule
in
its
ilarly was more concerned with the effects of
89
Chiarella's
Though
activities.
the particular costs and benefits of Chiarella's
actions were probably harmful, 9° the primary concern was the harmful effects
of an equal access or parity of information rule. 9'
Instead of merely setting a precedent that would be applicable only to the
extraordinary facts of Dirks, the Supreme Court wrote an opinion that will
pervade subsequent actions under rule lOb-5. 92 Since it is difficult to talk of
the meanings of something so broad as fiduciary duties in the context of
one case, it is helpful to reconcile the results of other cases. One way to do
this is to examine Dirks in the context of other cases and legal and economic
theories.

III.

ECONOMIC AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF THE
USE OF INSIDE INFORMATION

A.

Equal Access to Information

The Supreme Court is concerned with two competing policies: promoting
fair and honest markets, and encouraging the search for and production of

88. Indeed, this was the argument that the attorney general made, the respondent Dirks
emphasized, and other commentators suggested. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in Opposition at 17, Brief for Petitioner Raymond L. Dirks at 18, Dirks v. SEC,
103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: Fairnessversus Economic
Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517, 548 (1982); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 348.
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty
89.
between all participants in market transaction to forgo actions based on material,
nonpublic information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically
from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties... should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
90. See Easterbrook , supra note 88, at 323; see generally Heller, supra note 88.
91. An equal access or parity of information rule would seriously discourage the search
and production of valuable information. See generally Hirshliefer, The Private and Social Value
of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. EcoN. Rav. 561 (1971); R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIs OF THE LAW § 14.9 (2d ed. 1977).
92. Some courts may try to limit the scope of Dirks by interpreting the Court's analysis as
applicable only to disclosure of corporate crime. See Materia, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED.
99,526. However, others have not limited Dirks in such a way. See Lund, 570
SEC. L. REP.
F. Supp. 1397; Newman, 664 F.2d 12.
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information.9" The policy of fair and honest markets begs for full disclosure

and equal access to information, while the search for and production of
information favors the inducement of being able to exploit an informational
advantage. 94 The Court claims that the equal access theory has been abolished. Merely saying that it does not exist, however, does not eliminate it,
and it is not obvious from the results of the cases that such a policy does
not still exist in some form.
The Court declares that the obligation to disclose or refrain is based upon
a fiduciary relationship (one arising out of a feeling of trust and confidence

placed in the fiduciary), and not upon "one's ability to acquire information

because of his position in the market." 95 The concept of one's position in

the market, however, often coincides with the concept of a fiduciary. An
insider obviously has access to information a normal investor does not, and
is always considered a fiduciary.96 An outsider who is given access to information solely for corporate purposes may become a temporary insider
and, consequently, a fiduciary. 97 Finally, when one misappropriates information, he is a fiduciary and concomitantly has access to information in-

tended to be kept confidential. 9 The relationship between the fiduciary duty

and access to information is further substantiated by the often quoted rationale from In re Cady, Roberts, & Co. that the disclose or refrain duty
arises out of "a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to informa-

tion intended to be available only for a corporate purpose.'' 9 9
Depending on how equal access is defined, the fiduciary and equal access
to information concepts could be regarded as mutually inclusive. Under the
normal meaning of access, however, this does not appear to be true.1°°
Everyone has different opportunities to acquire information because of his

own personal resources, reputation and contacts. Requiring all market inves93. See generally Langevoort, supra note 20; Easterbrook, supra note 88; Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L.
REV., 322 (1979).
94. See sources cited supra note 93.
95. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3263 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
232 (1980).
96. See Brudney, supra note 93, at 343.
97. An issue arises here as to whether the temporary insider's fiduciary relationship is limited
to that information which he obtains through his temporary insider status. For example, would
an accountant hired by company X fall under the disclose or refrain rule with respect to any
public material information he received concerning X, or would he fall under the duty only
for the information he acquires through his relationship with X that makes him a temporary
insider? Brudney might argue that the temporary insider could not use information that came
to him by means other than his relationship with the corporation for the same reason that an
insider cannot: "The duty not to deal with their beneficiary in trust assets on the basis of
informational advantages about the trust does not rest on how they obtained the informational
advantage." Brudney, supra note 93, at 346.
98. It is important to note here that the fiduciary relationship is owed to the acquiring
company only. See supra text accompanying notes 69-78.
99. 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
100. "The act or opportunity of approaching; coming to or near; admittance." FUNK &
WAGNALLS STANDARD DESK DICTIONARY (1974).
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tors to have the same access to information seems to imply that all would
have to expend the same costs to acquire the information; since some would
be able to incur less expense because of their personal resources, reputation,
and contacts, this would be an unworkable policy.' ° ' Also, this equal access
concept is rejected not only by the language but by the result in Dirks, since
Dirks' costs of obtaining the information were less than those incurred by
because of his resourcefulness, reputation and "position
the average investor
0 2
market."'
in the
Professor Brudney had advocated a much more limited interpretation of
the equal access theory.
If one transactor, by reasons of his profession or regular occupational
interests or otherwise, acquires material non-public information which
he is not lawfully permitted to disclose to other transactors or which
public transactorscannot lawfully acquire, use of that information by the

former to his advantage and the latter's disadvantage is likely to be counterproductive in economic effect." '
If people were allowed to trade on their informational advantage that others
could not acquire lawfully, it would raise the cost of capital. 104Furthermore,
the incentives produced by letting persons trade on information that others
cannot acquire legally do not justify the costs:
Whether it is inside corporate information or market information or any
other imaginable relevant information, it is sought-and made available
to select few-in the course of fulfilling other purposes, such as rendering
services or selling goods to the source of the information or others; and
therefore, the incentive for personal gains from trading is not necessary
to induce those few to pursue it.''
An insider or temporary insider could not trade on the information acquired
in a fiduciary capacity because such inducement is not necessary. The trading,
raises the cost of capital caustherefore, has no socially redeeming value 0and
6
ing unambiguous damage to the market.
Brudney's unerodable informational advantage theory does not fully explain, however, why the Court accorded the role of market analyst such

101. Professor Easterbrook thinks for this reason that "access" is a meaningless term:
"People do not have or lack 'access' in some absolute sense. There are, instead, different costs
of obtaining information." Easterbrook, supra note 88, at 330. See also Galeno, Drawing the
Line on Insiders and Outsidersfor Rule 10M-5, 4 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 203, 227-33 (1981).
102. 103 S. Ct. at 3263 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33 n. 14.)
103. Brudney, supra note 93, at 355.
104. Id. at 356. See also infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
105. Brudney, supra note 93, at 356.
106. While this assertion seems fairly certain in the case of an insider, it is less compelling
in the case of the temporary insider. Some information the temporary insider acquires may
not be through the course of his employment, see supra note 97, hence the trading may be a
valuable incentive. The costs of drawing such a line between information acquired through the
fiduciary relationship and other information may outweigh the incentives such a policy would
create.
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deference in Dirks. The majority hypothesized that an analyst could receive

inside information without incurring a duty to disclose: "For example, it may
not be clear-either to the corporate insider or the recipient analystwhether the information will be viewed as material nonpublic information.
Corporate officials may mistakenly think that the information has already
been disclosed or that it is not material enough to affect the market."'0 7
The Supreme Court is concerned with the willingness of corporate officers
to release information so that a market professional can conduct more fruitful
investigations and add to his "mosaic" of information. 08 If the corporate
officers are continuously haunted by the prospect of lOb-5 liability they will

be less accommodating to the market professional's search for information. ,o9
Arguably, this deference could create an unerodable information advantage
between a market professional and the normal investor. The Supreme Court

indicates that it would be much more sympathetic to an accidental disclosure
between a market professional and an insider, than to one between an
investor and an insider; therefore, the exchange of information will be less
inhibited between the insider and the market professional. While this deference may not comport with the letter of Burdney's theory, it is merely a
presumption based on the roles of different actors in the market that can
be overcome. 1' 0 In other respects the Supreme Court appears to have labeled
certain types of access to information as fiduciary relationships. As Brudney
would suggest, each of the actors that falls into the fiduciary status has an
unerodable information advantage."'

107. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
108. "Mosaic" refers to the composite of information the analyst gathers. Some information
may not become material until it is evaluated in the context of the mosaic. It is plausible that
the Court is concerned with information that is not material to the insider but is to the analyst;
if the insider could be liable for giving information that he thought was immaterial but the
analyst could show was material, it would have an adverse effect on the insider's cooperation.
109. It could be argued that this is not just for the general benefit of the market place but
for the benefit of the firm. Financial analysts are often responsible for discovering latent
production capabilities and more efficient financial strategies.
110. In Dirks the Court said:
In determining whether the insider's purpose in making a particular disclosure is
fraudulent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read the parties' minds.
Scienter in some cases is relevant in determining whether the tipper has violated
his Cady, Roberts duty. But to determine whether the disclosure itself "deceive[s],
manipulate[s], or defraud[s]" shareholders . . . the initial inquiry is whether there
has been a breach of duty by the insider. This requires courts to focus on objective
criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from
the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate
into future earnings.
103 S. Ct. at 3265-66 (citations omitted). The role that the recipient of information is playing
in the market at the time of the receipt would seem to be merely one of the objective criteria.
111. The converse is not necessarily true; the person who has an informational advantage
may not be a fiduciary. Although the misappropriation theory and temporary insider doctrine
can cover most cases, the insider of a firm about to award a contract to firm B may be able
to trade in firm B's stock, and a supplier of firm B may be able to trade in B's stock upon
receipt of a large order from firm B.
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B.

Fairness

The policy of furthering fair and honest markets is often described in
vague and humanistic terms.'" 2 These foundations can also be derived from
economic theory. The securities markets can be viewed as a zero sum gambling game. ' 3 If the insiders are believed to be winning abnormally often
because of their access to material inside information, the average investor
will either: require a risk premium, 1 4 or try to obtain the information
corruptly in order to erode the information advantage." 5 In addition, allowing the insiders to trade may induce the managers to select riskier projects
in order to increase the volatility of the firm's stock prices." 6 Each has the
effect of raising the cost of capital.'
Allowing insiders to trade on their informational advantage would raise
their returns and thus increase the risk premium demanded by shareholders
and ultimately the cost of capital. Similarly, when an insider of a corporation
"tips" an outsider and receives a tangible or intangible benefit in return for
the information, he does so at the expense of the other shareholders of the
corporation as much as if he had traded on the information himself. The
Supreme Court was concerned with precisely this when it noted that "[t]he
theory . ..is that the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is
in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal infor'

112. Many phrase the purpose of the 1934 Act in terms of promoting fairness and preventing
manipulation without explaining what is fair and what is manipulative. See generally Ferber,
The Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to ProfessorManne, 23 VAND. L. Rav. 621
(1970); Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock
Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425 (1967).

113. See Scott, Insider Trading: Rule l0b-5, Disclosure, and CorporatePrivacy, 9 J. LEGAL
801, 807-10 (1980).
114. Id.
115. See Brudney, supra note 93, at 356. Brudney expresses another possibility that the
investor may avoid dealing with the insider altogether. Though this is a tenable argument it
seems safe to say that it is unnecessary because the investor could always be lured by a high
risk premium.
116. The manager's expected gain may be higher by selecting riskier projects if he could
trade on inside information. If the project fails he would only lose his salary at most but if
the project succeeds he could make many times his salary. In most cases the loss would simply
be shouldered by the shareholders. See Easterbrook, supra note 88, at 332.
117. The cost of capital can be evaluated in several different ways. First, the cost of capital
for the entire market would increase if insiders were allowed to trade because the return
perceived by the average investor would not be as high as if the insiders were barred from
trading. Most commentators seem to talk in terms of an entire market when they make this
argument. See Brudney, supra note 93, at 356 ("If the market is thought to be systematically
populated with such transactors ... " referring to people trading on inside information and
raising the cost of capital).
Second, the cost of capital for a single firm might increase if it were known that the insiders
were trading on their information. In this case the cost of capital theory would transcend
economic analysis and market efficiency; the insider would be responsible for diminishing the
value of the property he holds in trust. The reasoning, however, begs the next question: does
the value of the trust really diminish? Perhaps not if the corporation does not plan to enter
the primary security market, and the diminished market value of the secondary securities does
not adversely affect the firm.
STUD.
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mation, or other things of value for himself.""' In other words, the Court
seems to be worried about a transfer of wealth in which the insider gains
at the expense of the shareholders of.the same corporation."19
The transfer of wealth theory sheds a different light on Dirks. Because
Secrist did not allegedly gain,' 20 he did not cause the shareholders as a class
to lose. As a group the shareholders would have ultimately lost the same
amount no matter what Secrist did. Secrist only made the loss materialize
more quickly. Hence, there was no redistribution of wealth between the class
of shareholders and the insiders. 121
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent argues that the result in Dirks is unfair:
"The fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the breach does
not eradicate the shareholders' injury."' 22 Perhaps Justice Blackmun believes
that the shareholders should receive identical returns, and the fact that those
who sold their stock avoided a loss is thereby unfair.2 2 But, as another
commentator has noted, this result is incorrect because it does not explain
why some decided to buy and why some decided to sell. 24 Nor does it
recognize the fact that some shareholders lose and some gain whenever stocks
2 5
are traded.
The transfer of wealth concept can also help explain why the person who
misappropriates information from an acquirer in a proposed tender offer is
not liable to the issuer in a private damage action under 10b-. 26 The insider
of the issuing corporation has not benefited and the insider of the acquiring
corporation, who has been damaged, owes no duty to the shareholders of
the issuing corporation. There has, consequently, been no transfer of wealth
between the insiders and the outsider except to the point that the outsider

118. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266 (quoting Brudney, supra note 93, at 348).
119. It is important to note that the transfer must occur between insiders and shareholders
of the same corporation. In a tender offer situation the insiders of a corporation could lawfully
trade in the shares of the issuing corporation under 10b-5. The Second Circuit court in Chiarella
had trouble explaining why the printer could not trade in the shares but the insiders could.
This may have resulted from the court not explicitly stating what types of redistribution it
thought was unfair. For a related point see Scott, supra note 113, at 814.
120. Whether Secrist gained depends on the definition of gain. See infra text accompanying
notes 121-53.

121. In Dirks the redistribution occurred only between shareholders. However, one might
argue that the shareholders who avoided a loss were friends of Secrist.
122. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3271 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun relies on the law of
trusts to state that the trustee is liable for acts causing diminution of value to the trust. See
A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 1665 (1967). This is a strange application to the fact
situation of Dirks. Corporate officials are not subject to the same duties as a trustee. See id.
§ 16A. Even if they were subject to the same duties Secrist did not create a diminution in the
value of the trust. Also the relationship of trusteeship is awkwardly applied in a situation involving corporate fraud.
123. See Easterbrook, supra note 88, at 324.
124. Id. This is especially true in Dirks. Some shareholders after hearing Dirks' allegations
and noticing the fall in the price of Equity Funding stock, bought more shares believing that
the price was artificially depressed.
125. Id. at 325.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 64-78.
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has benefited at the expense of the insiders of the acquiring corporation.127
C.
1.

Market Efficiency
Flow of Information

The efficient capital market hypothesis states that the more quickly accurate information is disseminated into the market, the more quickly financial
2
and ultimately real resources will be allocated to their most efficient uses.
The Supreme Court has apparently subscribed to such a view in Dirks by
recognizing the need to search for and produce information and accord
29
deference to market professionals.
a.

positive or negative

The disclose or refrain rule may be too strong. It has been argued that
the rule should apply not to all types of information, but only to positive
information. 30 If the information is positive and the insider is under the
disclose or refrain duty, he will be inclined to disclose the information since
by withholding it he cannot accrue any extra profits through trading. 3' The
same is not true if the information is negative. In that case, the insider may
refrain from disclosing the information in order to protect his reputation or
33
avoid liability. 32 Resources, consequently, will not be allocated efficiently.
The positive/negative distinction could have been applied in Dirks. If
Secrist and Dirks had fallen under and adhered to the disclose or refrain
duty, Dirks would not have had sufficient incentive to vigorously pursue
Secrist's allegations. Since Dirks could exploit the informational advantage
to enhance his reputation, he continued his investigations and truncated a
costly fraud.' 34 Because Secrist ostensibly did not benefit,' 3 his actions unambiguously enhanced market efficiency. Had he benefited, however, the

127. The outsider has gained and the acquiring corporation has been damaged by the rise
in the issuer stock's price.
128. E.g., Heller, supra note 88, at 530.
129. See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263 ("Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because
a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes
is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market").
130. See Scott, supra note 113, at 811.
131. Id.at 810.
132. Id. One can argue that the insider's interest in future credibility will induce him to
release the information. On the other hand, businesses have been known to try to cover up
their earlier mistakes.
133. See generally Heller, supra note 88.
134. Dirks wanted a reputation of taking care of his clients well, not just the general fame
that disclosure to the SEC followed by a successful investigation could have rewarded him.
See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3269 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135. See text accompanying notes 80-81.
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net gain from his disclosure to Dirks would have been at issue. While the
flow of information would have been improved, there would have been a
transfer of wealth involved between an insider and an outsider, thus potentially raising the cost of capital. This was the case in In re Investors Management Co., in which the tippees received non-public information regarding
a decrease in quarterly earnings from Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch, because
of its status as underwriter for the firm, could have been deemed to possess
36
a temporary inside relationship.
b.

foreknowledge v. discovery

The Supreme Court felt that recognizing a duty to disclose or refrain for
the mere possession of inside information could have an inhibiting influence
on the role of market analysts and the production of information. 3 7 Moreover, allowing a financial analyst to parlay the information he discovers into
reputational benefits by advising his clients is a vital incentive to a vigorous
search for information.'38 Allowing an outsider to benefit from foreknowledge, however, is not beneficial and implies that the ultimate source sold it
selectively for something of reciprocal value. 39 Often it is the insider who
has sold this information, and as a result, a redistribution of wealth between
the class of shareholders and the insiders of the corporation occurs.
Raymond Dirks clearly produced information when he corroborated allegations and disclosed a fraud that had eluded the investigations of three
major accounting firms.' 40 If he had known before his investigations that
his efforts could not have been translated into a reputational benefit, it is
doubtful he would have investigated. ,4 Dirks did not receive any information
that another diligent and resourceful analyst could not obtain. 42 In sum,
Dirks' actions were clearly laudable, the motive was necessary to his search,
and he produced material information. The opposite result is true, however,
in almost every other case in which the courts have held a tippee liable under
lOb-5.' 43 The information was not obtained by skill and industry, but rather
through a gift emanating from an insider.
136. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
137. This is what the court is concerned with when it writes: "It is the nature of this type
of information, and indeed of the markets themselves that such information cannot be made
simultaneously available to all of the corporation stockholders or the public generally." Dirks,
103 S. Ct. at 3263 (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Indeed it seems almost satirical for the SEC to argue that Dirks received material
information. It apparently was not material for the SEC to command further investigations.
It was Dirks' research that made the information material. See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3259 n.8.
140. See id.
141. Dirks himself was willing to talk to anyone that would call him. See id. at 3255.
142. Id.
143. See Easterbrook, supra note 88, at 331.
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2.

Management Costs

To induce individuals and corporations to search and acquire socially
valuable information, those same individuals and corporations must be able
to exploit the information upon obtaining it. Disclosure of some information
reduces its value to the rightful owner and in'some cases insider trading can
operate as disclosure. 144 When an insider trades in the issues of a firm to
which his corporation will soon make a tender offer, he raises the price of
such issues and decreases the value of the tender offer information to his
corporation. 14 Hence, some uses of inside information decrease the value
of the information to the business entity.
Misuse of information can impose other costs. If the insider is allowed
to trade on his informational advantage, he is encouraged to manipulate the
timing and release of the information to alter prices and avoid detection in
an effort to profit from the information. 46 This could be a costly use of
the investor's time and effort that would be better spent managing principal.
If it is known, furthermore, that the insider is trading, the firm's cost of
capital will increase in the primary market for securities, and the price of
the secondary market securities will decline. 47
United States v. Chiarellais an example of how the misuse of information
can cause the value of the information to decline. Searching for companies
to acquire is socially valuable. If Chiarellas are allowed to misuse the information, however, firms will either stop searching for the information or
incur extra costs to protect it.

48

In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the

issuance of the second press release allowing insiders to trade on their
information was costly not only from the standpoint of the dollar cost of
the release and other protective measures, but also from the opportunity
cost of the management's time and effort spent contriving and operating
the manipulative devices. Furthermore, this activity, had it been allowed to
continue, could have affected the primary and secondary market securities
adversely. The information relating to Equity Funding's corporate fraud,
however, was not legitimate or socially desirable information; it impeded
the efficient allocation of financial and ultimately real resources. While its
concealment encouraged the further production of such information, its
disclosure ended the costly protection of the information.

144. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 66-82.
145. See generally Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
146. See supra note 117.
147. If the firm knows that others can exploit the information they have searched to obtain,
it will incur costs keeping the information secret.
148. The protection of the information of Equity Funding was costly in two respects: (1)
the effort and money of Equity Funding to protect the fraud; and (2) the cost of prolonging
the investigations.
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FRAMEWORK OF A BALANCING TEST

The arguments paraded above represent some that can be reconciled with
what appears to be the current rationale and position of the Supreme Court.
By creating a flexible fiduciary duty concept the Court has shown that it is
amenable to both fairness and efficiency concerns. Because the duty is flexible
it will not always be clear exactly who is and who is not a fiduciary and
whether the duty has been breached. When there is such uncertainty, the
analysis should consider whether the defendant has an unerodable informational advantage, and should evaluate the effect of any rule arising from
the analysis on the cost of capital, the production of information, and
management costs.
In many instances, applying these different arguments will not give an
unambiguous answer. Dirks is an example of this situation. Dirks probably
enhanced market efficiency because he helped inform the market of Equity
Funding's true financial position. Dirks' actions, however, also may have
raised the cost of capital. Though Secrist did not receive any monetary
benefit, he probably did receive a reputational benefit. A transfer of wealth
between a class of outsiders and a class of insiders was thus created, and
the actions of Dirks to some degree were, therefore, unfair.
The same ambiguity is present when analyzing the effects of the rule from
Dirks. The absolution of Dirks will enhance the market analyst's search for
information in the future, but will do so at the expense of facilitating future
transfers of wealth between insiders and shareholders. In other words, there
is a trade off between allocating resources more efficiently and fairness.
It is exactly these concerns of efficiency and fairness that the court struggled with in Dirks. Justice Powell wrote that convicting Dirks would encumber the market analysts' search for information. 49 Justice Blackmun,
on the other hand, argued that the scienter requirement is sufficient to
protect the analyst. 50 Both Justices' views are tenable depending on the
importance ascribed to the market analyst and the protection the analyst is
accorded by the scienter requirement.
Both Blackmun's and Powell's analyses of the fairness of Dirks' actions,
however, are flawed. The result in Dirks, according to Justice Powell, is
fair because Secrist did not benefit at the expense of the shareholders.' 5' As
discussed earlier, this result is not correct because Secrist probably received
a reputational benefit. 5 2 Justice Blackmun contended that the result, regardless of the insider's motives, is unfair because some shareholders were
losers.1 53 This is not quite correct either, because some shareholders will

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

103 S. Ct. at 3262-63.
Id.at 3271 n.ll.
See id. at 3268.
See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
103 S. Ct. at 3771. See also supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
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always lose when shares are traded, and the fact that some shareholders do
lose does not mean that a fraud has been committed. According to the
analysis in this Note, Justice Powell is wrong for the right reason while
Justice Blackmun is right for the wrong reason. Moreover, both are incorrect
because they imply that an answer to this question ends the analysis. Dirks'
actions were to some degree unfair but they also contributed to a more
efficient market. Condoning Dirks, furthermore, will encourage other analysts to contribute to fairness and efficiency in the same manner in the
future. Though Justice Blackmun disagrees with using a balancing test, use
of such test is almost inevitable when the underlying policy arguments are
coucfied in terms of fairness and efficiency. It would have been difficult for
Dirks to trade in a manner that was most fair and efficient to everyone.
More importantly, the effect of any rule will rarely be to encourage people
to act most fairly and efficiently simultaneously, because these are two
competing policies.
CONCLUSION

The Dirks decision reflects the Court's willingness to look at policies that
further fair and efficient markets in an attempt to give substance to the
fiduciary concept. While the Court has dealt somewhat successfully with
these two concerns, much development is still needed, particularly in regard
to what constitutes fairness. The arguments in this Note provide the tools
to develop more specific characteristics of fairness and efficiency, and reconcile the results of past cases. Since these concerns often compete against
each other, it is inevitable that they will often have to be weighed against
each other in the analysis.
MALCOLM A. TRIPP

